Reformasi


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When president Suharto left office in May 1998 it marked the beginning of a new period in Indonesian history. After being under the rule of Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime for more than three decades, Indonesia embarked for a new phase called Reformation (Reformasi in Indonesian). It was envisaged to be the starting period of a democracy with open and liberal politics in which extensive autonomy would be transferred to the regions, away from the center (decentralization). The basis of this transition was formulated in a law which passed parliament in 1999 and called for the transfer of administrative powers from the central government to the regional districts. The role of the central government was to be confined to matters connected to defence, foreign policy, fiscal-monetary and macroeconomic policy, justice and religion. Not less important was that the regions would receive a larger share of revenues from the regional production of natural resources. However, as not every region is blessed with abundant natural resources, it increased the gap between richer and poorer regions. Along with power, corruption was also decentralized to the regional level where so-called shadow states emerged in which the regional elite is in control of power, business and money flows. One of the victims is the environment. In exchange for large sums of money, logging permits were granted on a large scale.
The process of decentralization was also accompanied by regional violence entrenched with ethnic or religious aspects because of the emergence of competition for local political positions in conjunction with a revival of regional identities. For more information on this topic, please visit the Ethnic and Religious Violence section.


The Bacharuddin Habibie Administration (1998-1999)

Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, vice president during Suharto's last presidential term, replaced Suharto in 1998 when the latter stepped down from the presidency. But this did not mean an end to the political system that had been applied during the New Order. Many Indonesians were highly suspicious of Habibie because of his closeness to Suharto (who had been a father figure to Habibie) and the fact that he had been an important player in Suharto's political patronage system. Habibie's refusal to order a thorough investigation into Suharto's accumulated wealth only strengthened this distrust.
Habibie had no other option than to launch the reform program. It would have been political suicide if he did not comply with demands of the Indonesian public. During Habibie's presidency thirty new laws were approved by the parliament (MPR), some of which characterized by fundamental breaks with the political past. A number of noteworthy reforms were:
Introduction of freedom of the press
Allowing the establishment of new political parties and unions
Release of political prisoners
Limiting the presidency to two terms of five years
Decentralization of power to the regions
Another important decision was to schedule new general elections, to be held in June 1999. Parliament had no intention yet, however, to reduce political influence of the army and to order an investigation into Suharto's wealth.
Indonesia entered a period of increasing violence in the regions. East Java was plagued by mysterious killings (perhaps led by army units) while religious violence flared up in Jakarta, Ambon (Moluccas), Kupang (West Timor) and West Kalimantan. Moreover, three regions rebelled against the central authorities: Aceh (Sumatra), Irian Jaya (Papua) and East Timor. It caused an environment in which foreign investors were hesitant to invest, thus holding back economic recovery for the country. Not less important was the sanitation of the Indonesian financial sector, which had been the heart of the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), set up in January 1998, became a powerful agency that undertook an integrated and comprehensive series of activities consisting of matters such as bank liability programs, the recovery of state funds, bank restructuring, bank loan restructuring, and shareholders settlements.
The East Timor case was one that caused much conflict, both nationally and internationally. East Timor had declared independence in 1975 but was invaded by Indonesia the following year. This did not end its desire for independence. Habibie had an open-minded stance towards East Timor's independence. He stated that if East Timor rejects the special status of autonomous province within Indonesia, it can become independent. This statement of Habibie was not agreed upon by the Indonesian army that fiercely wanted to prevent separation from Indonesia. According to the army East Timor's separation was dangerous for Indonesian unity as it could lead to a domino effect in the other provinces. It was decided that the people of East Timor could express themselves on this matter through a referendum. The outcome of this referendum was that 78 percent of the voters chose for independence. The Indonesian army subsequently reacted by ravaging much of East Timor, killing more than one thousand people.
Habibie's reputation was severely damaged by losing control over the situation in East Timor. Although it were army units and civilian militias that committed the extreme violence, Habibie was personally held responsible being acting president. Moreover, Habibie himself became linked to a big corruption scandal involving Bank Bali. This bank received funds from the IBRA for its recapitalization but -allegedly- almost half of these funds were used for Habibie's campaign team.


Elections of 1999

After 1955 the Indonesian people were forced to wait for 44 years to witness another example of free and fair parliamentary elections. In this election people voted for a political party, not for an individual. Since there were no limitations on the establishment of political parties as part of the reform program, Indonesia had witnessed the mushrooming of many such parties. No less than 48 parties were allowed to participate in the elections of 1999, although most of these parties would play an insignificant role. In modern Indonesian politics a political party can be regarded as a political vehicle for its leader instead of an institution that expresses a shared ideology or vision; and only a few people could count on public support during the 1999 elections.
One of these people was Megawati Soekarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia's first president Soekarno. She had established a new party PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) in 1998 after being outcasted from the PDI in 1996. Due to her father's legacy and her opposition to the New Order towards the end of Suharto's rule, she enjoyed widespread popularity (especially on the islands of Java and Bali). Similar to her father, she stressed national unity and propagated secular nationalism. Another popular national figure was Abdurrahman Wahid who had founded the PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) in 1998. Previously, he worked as chairman of the biggest Muslim organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), but now set his eyes on the presidency. Wahid propagated a sort of tolerant nationalism and could rely on popular support from the traditional Muslim community (mostly on Java). Habibie, acting president, fostered ambitions to maintain his position. Although not enjoying much popularity, he could rightfully claim that he launched the reform program and could benefit from Golkar's powerful political machine which stretched up to the village level. Lastly, Amien Rais, exponent of opposition against Suharto's New Order, joined the race with his PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional).     
An important matter during these elections was that seats in parliament would be divided in half. The island of Java received half of the seats while the other half would go to all other islands. This was done as a measure to lessen Java's dominant position in politics. But as Java is much more densely populated than Outer Java, it basically implied that a non-Javanese vote was more powerful than a Javanese one. This situation would have far reaching consequences for the results in this election.
Parliamentary Election 1999
       1999
 PDI-P       34%
 Golkar       22%
 PKB       13%
 PPP       11%
 PAN        7%
Around 90 percent of the Indonesian electorate came to cast their vote on 7 June 1999. As could be expected, the PDI-P received most of the votes (34 percent) with Golkar coming in second (22 percent). However, these two parties were allocated almost a similar amount of seats in the parliament as the PDI-P received most of the votes from Java, while Golkar enjoyed most votes from the Outer Islands.  
In October Habibie had to deliver an accountability speech in front of the parliament. This speech was a report regarding his performance as president and the performance of policies during his presidency. His speech was rejected by a majority of the members of parliament. After this rejection Habibie decided to renounce his bid for the presidency in 1999. This meant that there were now just two persons who enjoyed significant political support to become the next president of Indonesia: Megawati and Wahid. In another session the Indonesian parliament eventually chose Wahid as the new president. Megawati became the new vice president and Rais was elected as chairman of the parliament.


The Abdurrahman Wahid Presidency (1999-2001)

In order to establish a broad based coalition Wahid appointed members from many political parties as well as army officers as ministers to his cabinet. But this diverse composition also implied a lack of cohesion within the cabinet and, moreover, it contained few reformers. Wahid did put effort in reducing the political role of the army but this led to conflict and the subsequent loss of support from the army. Without army support there were few means to survive for the president as Indonesia was plagued by conflicts and violence in the regions. These regional outbursts needed army intervention but due to the conflict with Wahid the army did not seem to have any interest in settling or interfering, resulting in the undermining of Wahid's presidency.      
Corruption cases still seemed to be the rule rather than the exception. In his first year as president, Wahid sacked seven ministers who were all involved in alleged corruption cases. Four of these ministers belonged to the four most important coalition partners: PDI-P, Golkar, PPP and PAN. This meant that Wahid became even more isolated. And - even more serious - Wahid himself also became linked to two corruption scandals which eventually led to his impeachment. These two scandals were called 'Buloggate' and 'Bruneigate', each involving the abstraction of public funds. Indonesian parliament saw this as a great opportunity to impeach Wahid and Megawati was subsequently appointed as the new president, while Hamzah Haz (leader of the PPP) became the new vice president.


The Megawati Soekarnoputri Presidency (2001-2004)

Towards the end of Suharto's New Order rule, the late Soekarno (Indonesia's first president) became a symbol of opposition to the government. Soekarno was the national hero who had devoted his life to - and succeeded in - reaching independence. Most of the anti-Suharto protesters were born during the New Order regime which lasted for more than three decades and therefore probably had rudimentary knowledge only of the pre-Suharto era. But for them Soekarno represented freedom, an independence from Suharto. Therefore it was only logical that his daughter, Megawati, could count on much support among the people. But this support was based on her status as daughter of Soekarno only and not based on her political vision nor skills. Her cabinet did not differ markedly from Wahid's initial cabinet: it contained a broad parliamentary basis and army officers were well represented. Megawati herself did not do a lot of decision making, which she left to her ministers. There were no signs that corruption was dealt with while the status quo in the government remained. 
But although Megawati herself did not seem highly supportive of political reforms, the reform process had in fact already been initiated in 1999 when parliament commenced designing new laws (including constitutional amendments) which would become effective during Megawati's presidency. These reform measures implied a significant increase in democratic checks and balances which put an end to the possibility of an authoritarian regime. It placed power in the hands of the people instead of the government. Moreover, the executive and legislative branches were separated more strictly.  
Megawati's predecessor made strong efforts to reduce the influence of the army (which actually undermined his position) but Megawati herself had no intention to mingle with army affairs. As a consequence the army would regain some influence in politics. International developments also enlarged the role of the Indonesian army. After the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, the American government resumed cooperation with the Indonesian army (which had been halted since the army's participation in violence in East Timor in 1999) to combat international terrorism. Although parliament had been careful in reducing the political role of the army, it was the commander-in-chief of the army himself who stated that by 2004 army fractions in the parliament should be eliminated; a military officer who wanted to become active in politics would have to resign from his military position first. These reforms were realized but did not mean an end to political influence of the army in Indonesian society. To this day the army is a strong force as former generals who are active in politics can still rely on a network within the army and, moreover, the army is still entangled in business activities in the regions.


Elections of 2004

Parliamentary election

In April 2004 approximately 84 percent of the Indonesian electorate (constituting around 113,5 million people) casted their vote for national parliament. Contrary to the election in 1999, this time Indonesians could vote for specific candidates of a party which brought forward a more personal element in the election. In this election the two biggest parties of the previous election, to wit Golkar and PDI-P, lost their absolute majority. The PDI-P tumbled, as could be expected, from 34 percent to 19 percent as the Indonesian people were not satisfied with Megawati's presidential performance that seemed to lack vision and leadership while corruption within her party was growing. Golkar, that had proved to be able to survive without the support of Suharto and the army, maintained their share of the votes (22 percent), although they had expected to do better. 
But two newcomers, both not having participated in the 1999 elections, drew attention. The first one being the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, abbreviated PKS), a party which places great emphasis on the role of Islam in public life. It received seven percent of the votes in the 2004 election. The second one being the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, abbreviated PD). This party was the political vehicle of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (often referred to as SBY), the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs in Megawati's cabinet. Yudhoyono had hoped to become vice president in 2001 but lost out to Hamzah Haz. Having high political aspirations of his own and the support of a small group of intellectuals around him (who set up the PD especially for him), Yudhoyono seemed to be a potential prospective president candidate for the 2004 elections. This bothered president Megawati and caused a riff between the two. In early 2004 Yudhoyono left the Megawati cabinet, a decision which gave him great public sympathy. The PD received just over seven percent of the votes, enabling Yudhoyono to participate in the upcoming presidential elections of 2004 (a party needed a minimum of five percent to be authorized to nominate a candidate for the presidency).
Parliamentary Election 2004
      2004     1999
 PDI-P      19%      34%
 Golkar      22%      22%
 PKB      11%      13%
 PPP       8%      11%
 PD       7%        -
 PKS       7%        -

Presidential election

In July 2004 the Indonesian people went to the ballot boxes for the presidential elections. The winner of this election would require an absolute majority, therefore it seemed likely that a second round would be needed in which the top two of the first round compete each other. Due to the fact that the president and vice president participate in this election as an inseparable couple, its composition is of strategic importance. Yudhoyono (PD), leading in the speculative polls, teamed up with Jusuf Kalla (a businessman from Eastern Indonesia). Megawati (PDI-P) paired with Hasyim Muzadi (chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama). Another pair that seemed to have a chance, although slight, was Wiranto (a former army general, nominated by Golkar) who was joined by Sallahudin Wahid (vice chairman of the National Human Rights Commission).
With 33.5 percent of the votes, less than expected, Yudhoyono and Kalla became the winners of the first round. On second place, thus entitled to contest in the second round, was the Megawati-Muzadi pair who received 26.5 percent of the votes. As expected, the second round was easily won by Yudhoyono with 60.5 percent and he was consequently inaugurated as Indonesia's new president on 20 October 2004.
Presidential Election 2004

     2004
 (1st round)
      2004 (2nd round)
 Yudhoyono,
 Kalla
    33.5%     60.5%
 Megawati,
 Muzadi
    26.5%     39.5%
 Wiranto,
 Wahid
    22.0%         -
 Rais,
 Yudho Husodo
    14.5%         -
 Haz,
 Gumelar
      3.0%         -


The Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Government I (2004-2009)

The Democratic Party (PD) was primarily established to function as Yudhoyono's political vehicle on his path towards the Indonesian presidency. It propagated democracy, pluralism and the professionalization of the army (Yudhoyono himself being a retired army general). But politics was not something new to Yudhoyono who was appointed chief of staff for social-political affairs (an army department) in 1997. At this position he showed his reformist nature when he presented the 'New Paradigm' which called for an end to direct military involvement in politics (through a gradual withdrawal from the national and regional parliaments) and called for a split between the army and police (this split was decided upon during Habibie's presidency and became effective during the Wahid administration). Later, Yudhoyono became minister of Mines and Energy during the Wahid presidency and coordinating minister for Legal, Political, and Security Affairs during Megawati's presidency. In both cases a fallout with the president led to his early departure. But he enjoyed popularity among the Indonesians due to his reformist ideas, his successful mediating in a number of regional violent conflicts, and his clean record of corruption (fighting corruption was in fact an important element in his campaigns prior to the elections). 
From the start expectations were very high. Yudhoyono, being regarded as a strong and balanced character, took office with ambitious reformist ideals such as the toppling of corruption and terrorism, the strengthening of democracy and human rights, and the fostering of accelerated economic growth. Surely his ambitions were - realistically speaking - too high as Indonesia is a difficult country to reform within a timespan of a few years. A slow and inefficient bureaucracy, opposing forces throughout society and widespread corruption (especially on the regional level) make it difficult to implement policies effectively. As promised during his campaign period, around half of Yudhoyono's cabinet ministers consisted of non-partisan professionals, especially on positions concerning the economy, in order to encourage professionalization.
Yudhoyono's presidency is also characterized by disasters causing some people to label him the 'disaster president'. Most famous natural disaster is the horrific tsunami in Aceh which killed more than 200,000 people in Aceh in 2004. Other disasters were the earthquake in Bantul (Central Java) in 2006 killing 6,000 people, the Sidoarjo mud flow ruining hundreds of hectares in East Java as well as causing the evacuation of thousands of people, multiple floods in Jakarta triggering the evacuation of about half a million people in 2007 and, lastly, the Merapi volcano eruptions in 2010 which killed 353 people and caused the evacuating of 350,000 people.  
A good achievement of the Yudhoyono administration is the fostering of strong macroeconomic fundamentals: foreign debt has declined impressively, foreign exchange reserves have improved and annual GDP growth has been satisfying. These strong fundamentals are what made Indonesia successfully sail through the global crisis of 2008-2009.


Elections of 2009 

Parliamentary election

The parliamentary elections for the DPR (People’s Representative Council) and DPD (Regional Representative Council), held on 9 April 2009, proved a clear victory for Yudhoyono's PD party (20.8 percent), while Golkar came in second (14.4 percent) and the PDI-P third (14.0 percent). Factors that contributed to this victory of the PD were massive cash programs to support the poor and declining food and fuel prices which contributed to the notion that the national economy was performing well. The public also considered Yudhoyono to be sincere in toppling corruption; the PD was known as the least corrupted political party. 
A party (or a coalition of parties) winning more than 112 seats (twenty percent) in the 560-member DPR or winning at least 25 percent of the national vote was allowed to nominate a candidate for the presidency. This put Yudhoyono in a strong position for the upcoming presidential election. But controversy arose on the new parliamentary threshold which stipulated that only parties receiving more than 2.5 percent of the popular vote would be seated in the DPR. This was a big disadvantage for the smaller parties.
An interesting outcome in this election was an increasing preference for secular-nationalist parties over Islamic or Islamist parties. The total of Islamic parties combined received 27.8 percent of the votes only, indicating a continuing declining trend compared to previous elections (38.1 percent in 2004).
Parliamentary Election 2009
     2009    2004    1999
 PD    20.8%     7.5%        -
 Golkar    14.5%    21.6%    22.4%
 PDI-P    14.0%    18.5%    33.7%
 PKS     7.9%     7.3%     1.4%
 PAN     6.0%     6.4%     7.1%

Presidential election

There were three pairs that ran for presidency and vice presidency in the presidential election of 2009. First of all acting president Yudhoyono whose PD party had won the parliamentary election and who was entitled for one more term as president. He chose Boediono as his running mate for the vice presidency. Boediono, an economist, was not affiliated to any political party and had been Governor of Bank Indonesia (the central bank) and coordinating minister for Economic Affairs during Yudhoyono's first cabinet. The second pair that run for office consisted of Golkar's Jusuf Kalla (Yudhoyono's former vice president) who partnered with former army general Wiranto (who had been accused of human rights abuses in East Timor). And lastly, Megawati joined the race again. This time she chose Prabowo as her running mate. Prabowo, also a former army general was son-in-law to Suharto and is believed to have been responsible for violence against anti-Suharto intellectuals and students, as well as against the ethnic Chinese community in Jakarta, during the riots in 1998. 
Without having to need a second round this time, Yudhoyono and Boediono won the presidential election with an absolute majority (60.8 percent). The international community regarded this as an important element for maintaining political stability in Indonesia. The Megawati-Prabowo pair received 26.8 percent of the votes, while Kalla-Wiranto came in third with 12.1 percent.
Presidential Election 2009
      2009
 Yudhoyono,
 Boediono
   60.8%
 Megawati,
 Prabowo
   26.8%
 Kalla,
 Wiranto
   12.1%

The Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Government II (2009-2014)

On 22 October 2009 the inauguration of the Second United Indonesia Cabinet took place. This cabinet was a coalition between the PD, Golkar and the four Islamic parties PKS, PAN, PKB and PPP. Besides appointing ministers from all these six parties, Yudhoyono also placed quite some professionals (non-partisan figures) on key ministry posts such as the ministries of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Trade, National Education and Health. Only two former army generals were appointed.  
But despite strong macroeconomic indicators, popular support for Yudhoyono has begun to erode. Yudhoyono did not meet expectations in toppling corruption, an important campaign slogan of his party. High corruption cases involving government staff made frequent headlines. More severely, the PD itself became deeply involved in corruption scandals when several of its members, including party treasurer Muhammad Nazaruddin, were accused and trialled for the 2011 Southeast Asian Games graft case in which - allegedly - bribes were paid connected to the construction of the athletes’ village. These scandals severely harmed both Yudhoyono's and his party's popularity.
According to many Indonesians the emergence of graft cases within the PD is a sign of Yudhoyono's weak leadership. On other subjects Yudhoyono is regarded to act weak as well. Many reform-minded Indonesians were disappointed when he did not back reformist Finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati when she - together with vice president Boediono - were criticized for mishandling a bank bailout case in 2008. Sri Mulyani moved to the World Bank Group where she started working as a managing director. Most people assume, however, that her early departure was connected to pressures from certain political forces with major business interests as her reform policies had led to conflicts with these interests. Another supposed weakness in Yudhoyono's leadership concerns his slow and unconvincing condemnation of violent attacks on minority religions, such as the Ahmadiyya killings in February 2011 when an Islamist mob killed members of the small local Ahmadiyya Islamic sect in the province of Banten.
The future of the PD remains uncertain. Popular support is declining fast and as Yudhoyono is not allowed to participate in the 2014 elections, a new candidate(s) for the party's leadership is needed but is yet to be found.

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